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RICHARD L. JENSEN, 
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GARY DeLAND, Director, 
Department of Corrections, 
Utah State Prison, 
Respondent. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
INTRODUCTION 
The Petitioner was convicted of aggravated robbery in the 
Third Judicial District Court. His conviction was affirmed by 
this Court in State v. Jensen, 727 P.2d 201 (Utah 1986). 
He subsequently filed a pro se petition of habeas corpus in 
the Third Judicial District Court. The petition was dismissed 
without evidentiary hearing. Petitioner then filed an appeal with 
this Court and subsequently filed his Appellant's Brief pro se. 
The State filed its Brief in response on September 27, 1988. 
On November 8, 1988 Petitioner's present counsel entered an 
appearance and requested an extension of time to file a reply 
brief. At that time it was unknown to Petitioner's counsel that a 
hearing had been scheduled on the merits of this case. On 
November 14, 1988 Petitioner's counsel appeared before this Court 
and requested that a Reply Brief be allowed in this matter and 
Case No. 870107 
(Category No. 3) 
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that any further decision be stayed until such time as the Reply 
Brief had been filed. The Court granted Petitioner's motion to 
file a Reply Brief on or before November 28, 1988. 
Petitioner's opening brief was filed pro se and addresses the 
substance of his claims rather than the procedure in the lower 
court. The brief of the State, on the other hand, focuses solely 
upon the procedural bars that it claims prohibits this action from 
being brought. This Reply Brief will, therefore, address these 
procedural claims raised by the State and will only, in passing 
discuss the substantive arguments originally raised by Petitioner 
pro se. 
STATEMENT OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
In order to fully understand the procedural contentions made 
in this case by the State it is necessary to briefly review the 
procedure which occurred in the court below regarding the habeas 
corpus petition. 
On December 5, 1986 Richard L. Jensen filed a "Petition for 
Writ of Habeas Corpus" pro se in the Third Judicial District 
Court. In his petition he alleged ineffective assistance of 
counsel based upon some fourteen specific claims; prosecutorial 
misconduct based upon six alleged claims; and error by the court 
based upon four claims. (Habeas Corpus record pp. 2-7; 
hereinafter HR). At the same time he also filed an "Affidavit in 
Support of Application to Proceed in Forma Pauperis" (HR 9-10), an 
"Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis" (HR 11), a "Motion for 
Appointment of Counsel and Preparation of Petitioner's Court File 
and Supporting Records" (HR 12), and an "Affidavit" listing the 
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court file and supporting records which he requested from the 
state to be supplied to him. (HR 13-14) . 
On December 18, 1986 an assistant attorney general filed a 
motion to dismiss in this case based upon the claim that the 
matter was still on direct appeal and therefore that the habeas 
corpus petition was premature. (HR 15). 
On December 22, 1986 Richard L. Jensen filed a "Motion to 
Ignore Respondent's Motion to Dismiss" based upon the fact that 
the decision had in fact been decided by this Court on October 8, 
1986 and therefore the habeas corpus relief was proper. (HR 
39-41) . 
On January 9, 1987 an Amended Motion to Dismiss was filed by 
the State on the basis that the Petition failed to state a claim 
upon which relief may be granted. (HR 62). A Memorandum in 
support of this motion was filed at that time. (HR 55-57). A 
Notice of Hearing was also filed at the same time setting forth a 
hearing to be held on January 23, 1987. (HR 63). 
On January 13, 1987 Richard Jensen filed a "Motion for 
Appointment of New Counsel" claiming a conflict of interest 
between himself and Phillip Jones and requesting that counsel 
outside of the Legal Defenders Office be appointed. (HR 65-66). 
On January 23, 1987 Richard L. Jensen, pro se, submitted 
to the lower court a "Memorandum in Rebuttal to Respondent's 
Amended Motion to Dismiss." (HR 72-75). Attached to this 
Memorandum was an "Affidavit as to Correctness of Supreme Court 
Appeal" signed by his previous appellate attorney Earl Xiaz (HR 
76); two letters written to Petitioner by Mr. Xiaz concerning his 
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direct appeal (HR 77-78); and a copy of a previous motion entitled 
"Motion for Order to Produce Document to Perfect Addendum to 
Supreme Court Appeal" filed September 2, 1986. (HR 79-80). 
On January 23, 1987 a hearing was held before the Honorable 
Richard H. Moffat. A transcript of that hearing is provided in 
the record. (Hereinafter Tr.). On January 28, 1987 the lower 
court entered a minute entry granting Respondent's Motion to 
Dismiss. (HR 71). A formal order of dismissal was entered on 
February 6, 1987. (HR 83-84). A notice of appeal from this order 
was filed on February 11, 1987. (HR 85). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PETITIONER IS NOT PROCEDURALLY BARRED 
FROM BEING GIVEN AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING 
BECAUSE OF ISSUES PREVIOUSLY RAISED IN 
HIS DIRECT APPEAL. 
The respondent claims that this habeas corpus action could 
not be initiated because "Petitioner knew or should have known at 
the time of the appeal of the existence of the errors alleged in 
his petition." (Respondent's Brief, p. 6). Although the rule 
cited by the Attorney General is correct as to any issues 
specifically addressed by this court in his direct appeal, it has 
no application to the majority of Petitioner's claims. The 
following analysis of this case reveals this error. 
It is fundamental that habeas corpus proceedings are civil in 
nature. Ludahl v. Larson, 586 P.2d 439 (Utah 1978); Farrell v. 
Turner, 482 P.2d 117 (Utah 1971). Rule 65B of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure specifically apply to habeas corpus and 
post-conviction hearings. The rules require an incarcerated 
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petitioner to "set forth in plain and concise terms the factual 
data constituting each and every manner in which the complainant 
claims that any constitutional rights were violated." 65 B(i)(2). 
The Rules also require him to state any prior proceedings which 
have occurred concerning those claims both direct appeals and 
habeas corpus actions, (Id,). The rule, however, does not 
require a petitioner to explain which claims were brought or could 
have been brought on direct appeal or to explain why such claims 
were omitted- (Respondent's Brief, pp. 4-6). 
The contention of the State is based upon a theory of waiver 
i.e., the failure to raise an issue on appeal waives any right to 
bring it up on a collateral attack. Andrews v. Morris, 607 P.2d 
816, 820-21 (Utah 1980). Under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
waiver is an affirmative defense to be plead in answer to a 
complaint. Rule 8(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; Dezner v. 
Continental Dry Cleaners, Inc., 548 P.2d 898 (Utah 1976). 
Under Rule 65B(6) within ten days after service of the 
complaint the attorney general "shall answer the complaint or 
otherwise plead thereto." In the instant case the attorney general 
chose to file a motion to dismiss rather than an answer. 
Essentially, the attorney general claimed that the failure of 
Petitioner to justify the absence of raising these contentions on 
direct appeal failed to state a claim under Rule 65B. The 
respondent further states in its brief before this Court: 
On appeal, Petitioner adds to his argument that 
his apellant counsel must have been ineffective since 
counsel did not raise on direct appeal the issues now 
asserted by Petitioner. However, because Petitioner 
failed to claim ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel in his petition below, he should be precluded 
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from raising that issue on appeal. State v. 
Steqgell, 660 P.2d 252 (Utah 1983). (Respondent's 
Brief at p. 6). 
It is the contention of the petitioner that a waiver claim 
cannot be made the basis of dismissing a habeas corpus petition 
without an inquiry by the lower court as to what issues were 
actually raised on direct appeal and as to what reasons, if any, 
such issues were not raised. It is not the burden of the 
petitioner to anticipate the defense of the state but rather it is 
the obligation of the state to raise these contentions so that the 
petitioner can answer them. Furthermore, subparagraph 8 of Rule 
65B(i) specifically provides that the Court "in each case" shall 
enter "specific findings of fact and conclusions of law and 
judgment, in writing," which again supports Petitioner's 
contention of a specific inquiry being made. 
In the instant case the lower court had before it a clear 
explanation as to why the claims being asserted by Petitioner in 
the habeas corpus proceeding had not been raised on direct appeal. 
In his memorandum in rebuttal to Respondent's Amended Motion to 
Dismiss he attached an affidavit which was made by his previously 
appointed direct appeal attorney, Earl Xiaz. (HR 76; copy of 
which is attached herein as Appendix A). The affidavit was 
prepared by Petitioner at the time of his direct appeal because he 
was aware of the rule in habeas corpus proceedings concerning 
waiver and was concerned that the contentions that Petitioner 
raised in his habeas corpus action should have been raised in the 
direct appeal. The affidavit clearly shows that the points were 
left out in direct appeal because of the advice of his 
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court-appointed attorney and that his attorney stated, "I take 
full responsibility for my client's failure to bring up his other 
points." 
Furthermore, during the habeas corpus proceeding itself 
Petitioner stated the following to the lower court judge: 
As to her [the assistant attorney general] point 
about collateral issues or the points about these 
issues should have been raised on direct appeal; as you 
see in my rebuttal to her argument, that I made 
numerous attempts to actually raise these issues. The 
issues she says should have been on direct appeal; I 
wrote my lawyer numerous times, I made him sign an 
affidavit that he knows what he is doing. So what 
they're arguing is, that the state appointed me 
ineffective counsel, because I asked for those other 
points to be brought up on my direct appeal. And he 
told me that these points did not fit in the appeal 
process. (Tr• 7) . 
* * * 
And I did not feel that he did right. My hands 
were tied. He was my attorney and he refused to put my 
points in. (Tr. 8). 
See also, Petitioner's Opening Brief, pp. 21-23. 
Assuming for purposes of the Motion to Dismiss that 
Petitioner's explanation of what occurred on direct appeal is 
correct, a prima facie rebuttal had been made to the waiver 
argument. As noted by this Court: 
In this case we refuse to indulge the fiction 
(contrary to the alleged facts) that the petitioner 
failed to assert a right when, allegedly, it was his 
attorney who failed to do so, and then on the basis of 
that default imposed the adverse consequence on 
petitioner himself. Chess v. Smith, 617 P.2d 341, 
344 (Utah 1980.) (Emphasis in original). 
The order of the lower court does not specifically mention 
the waiver issue unless such finding can be implied by the 
language that the court "finds that the petition fails to state a 
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claim upon which relief may be granted," (HR 83). If the question 
of waiver was in dispute then the lower court should have called 
an evidentiary hearing for the purpose of allowing Appellant's 
direct appeal attorney to testify as to the circumstances 
surrounding the apeal and whether the contentions raised by 
Petitioner in the habeas corpus proceeding were in fact attempted 
to be raised by him in the direct appeal. After such an 
evidentiary hearing the court could then enter specific findings 
and conclusions as to the waiver contention of the state. If, on 
the other hand, the court was satisfied by the existing record and 
affidavit of Mr. Xiaz that the petitioner had done everything he 
could do to preserve his claims on direct appeal then the waiver 
claim should have been discarded by the court and Petitioner 
should have been allowed to proceed with those claims not 
addressed in the direct appeal. 
In summary, therefore, Petitioner contends that the record 
now before this Court does not justify a finding of waiver on 
direct appeal and that either, as a matter of law, no waiver 
exists or, in the alternative, the matter should be remanded for 
an evidentiary hearing. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY FOUND THAT 
PETITIONER FAILED TO RAISE A CLAIM OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL MAGNITUDE. 
The lower court in its order of dismissal stated the 
following: 
The purpose of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
65B(i) is to allow a plaintiff to raise claims of 
fundamental unfairness at trial or of substantial and 
prejudicial denial of constitutional rights. The 
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claims raised by plaintiff fail to rise to the level of 
fundamental unfairness contemplated by Rule 65B(i) and 
so fail to rise to the level required for relief to be 
granted. (HR 83) 
It is fundamental that a plaintiff in a habeas corpus action 
is entitled to have the facts alleged reviewed in the light most 
favorable to him. Gonzales v. Morris, 610 P.2d 1285 (Utah 1980). 
The only issue before an appellate court on appeal from an order 
granting an ordinary motion to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim is whether it can be said that there is no state of facts 
which plaintiff could prove entitling him to relief under his 
claim. Grimsby v. Samson, 530 P.2d 291 (Wash. 1975). 
In matters involving incarcerated prisoners the United States 
Supreme Court in Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5 (1980) stated even a 
stronger standard: 
Petitioner's complaint, like most prisoner 
complaints filed in the Northern District of Illinois, 
was not prepared by counsel. It is settled law that 
the allegations of such complaint, "however inartfully 
pleaded" are held "to less stringent standards than 
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. . . ." Haines 
v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972). See also, Maclin v. 
Paulson, 627 F.2d 83 (7th Cir. 1980); French v. Heyne, 
547 F.2d 994, 996 (7th Cir. 1976). 
Such a complaint should not be dismissed for 
failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt 
that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support 
of his claim which would entitle him to relief. 
Haines, supra, at 520-21. And, of course, the 
allegations of the complaint are generally taken as 
true for purposes of a motion to dismiss. Cruz v. 
Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). Id^ at 9-10. 
As noted by the State in its brief there were three central 
claims alleged by Petitioner in the habeas corpus action: (1) 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel; (2) prosecutorial 
misconduct; and (3) trial court error. (Respondent's Brief, pp. 
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4-6). It is the contention of the petitioner that he is entitled 
to an evidentiary hearing on these claims unless this Court can 
say, as a matter of law, that under no set of facts or 
circumstances can these claims give rise to a constitutional 
deprivation. 
It is clear from reviewing the transcripts of January 23, 
1987 that the lower court never made any factual inquiry as to the 
claims asserted by the petitioner- No request for clarification 
as to any of these claims were made. No findings of fact or 
conclusions of law were entered as to any of the specific claims 
since the habeas corpus petition was dismissed as a matter of law 
for failure to state any claim. 
Admittedly, the factual allegations contained in the habeas 
corpus petition were not always clearly stated. In some instances 
it is difficult to understand exactly what facts Petitioner was 
relying upon in making his claims. In other instances, however, 
it is quite apparent the claim being asserted. However, the 
inability of the petitioner to artfully plead his petition should 
not be held against him especially in a pro se petition. 
At the least, the lower court should have made a factual 
inquiry of the petitioner concerning his claims or should have 
given him an opportunity to explain exactly what he intended by 
each claim. The lower court in this case failed to give 
Petitioner any opportunity to clarify the factual context upon 
which the claims were based. In fact, Petitioner had never 
received the documents he requested from the Court, was in a state 
of limbo as to whether or not a new attorney would be appointed to 
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assist him at the hearing, and had less than two weeks to attempt 
a pro se response to the State's motion to dismiss. 
Aside from these procedural irregularities, the general claim 
of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel should 
have in and of itself required an evidentiary hearing regardless 
of the specifics of the pleadings made by the petitioner. As 
noted by the Supreme Court of Nevada: 
A claim of ineffective trial counsel is generally 
based on factual allegations which must be explored at 
an evidentiary hearing. Consequently, a claim of 
ineffective trial counsel is properly raised in 
proceedings for post-condition relief. Because of the 
usual need for an evidentiary hearing to resolve a 
claim of ineffective counsel, the failure to raise the 
claim on direct appeal does not constitute a waiver of 
the claim for purposes of post-conviction proceedings. 
Daniels v. State, 688 P.2d 315, 316 (Nev. 1984). 
(Emphasis added). 
This same principle was expounded by this Court in 
Martinez v. Smith, 602 P.2d 700 (Utah 1979) in which a 
petitioner claimed that his lower court counsel had been 
ineffective. The state in that case moved to dismiss the 
petition arguing that the issues should have been raised on 
timely appeal and that habeas corpus was not available as a 
substitute for regular appellate review. The Court in ordering a 
hearing be held stated: 
By our decision herein we do not mean to be 
understood as suggesting or even implying that the 
petitioner's allegations are true. (We interpose the 
observation that Mr. Caine is an attorney of good 
repute who has had considerable practice in the field 
of criminal law). But in the face of a motion to 
dismiss, the court should regard them as true, deny the 
motion, and proceed to determine the facts. 
Considering the petition in the light of what has 
just been said, it is our conclusion that it warrants 
inquiry into and determination as to the facts alleged. 
-11-
Id, at 702. (Emphasis added). 
Even in the case relied upon by the State, Codianna v. 
Morris, 660 P.2d 1101 (Utah 1983) a specific evidentiary hearing 
was conducted by the lower court as to petitioner's claim that he 
was deprived of effective assistance of counsel. While this 
Court, in reviewing the transcript of the evidence taken in that 
proceeding, concluded that counsel was not ineffective, it 
nevertheless concurred that the lower court was in the best 
position to evaluate the claim. See also, Johnson v. Morris, 645 
P.2d 51 (Utah 1982) (hearing held on claim of incompetence of 
counsel and without transcript of proceeding lower court judgment 
presumed correct). 
As recently as October 26 of this year this Court in Bundy v. 
DeLand, 94 Utah Adv. Rep. 9 (October 26, 1988) distinguished 
claims which could be disposed of without an evidentiary hearing 
from those claims which required such a hearing. In that case the 
petitioner claimed nine specific instances of ineffective counsel. 
This Court noted: 
If counsel's deficiencies were sufficiently 
grievous to deprive plaintiff of effective assistance 
of counsel, they constitute a violation of due process 
that is clearly reviewable by habeas corpus review. 
While several of these claims might reasonably have 
been raised on direct appeal under the Brown v. 
Turner/Cordianna v. Morris standard, we are now in the 
most appropriate position to review the claims in that 
a record was established in the evidentiary hearing 
below. Id. at p. 10. 
This Court affirmed the lower court's decision since "the 
evidence supports the district courtfs findings and conclusions 
that Plaintiff's claims are without merit, including the claim 
that his counsel was inebriated at trial." Id. at 11. 
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The claims of Petitioner regarding his counsel in the lower 
court clearly require that an evidentiary hearing be held. It 
cannot be said, as a matter of law, that under no set of 
circumstances or facts produced by Petitioner could relief not be 
granted. 
Petitioner claimed inadequate investigation by his trial 
counsel. The California Supreme Court in discussing a claim that 
trial counsel failed to properly investigate the facts of the case 
stated this rule: 
Where the record on its face discloses that 
counsel failed to investigate the facts in the manner 
required of a diligent and conscientious advocate, the 
conviction must be reversed because the defendant 
thereby has been deprived of adequate assistance of 
counsel. On the other hand, if the record fails 
affirmatively to disclose counsel's incompetence, the 
factual elicitation in a habeas corpus evidentiary 
hearing is the proper procedural remedy by which to 
test the competency issue. People v. Fierson, 599 
P.2d 587, 597. 
The following cases, in addition to those previously cited, 
stand for the proposition that habeas corpus relief will be 
granted to a petitioner if the facts and circumstances justify 
substantiation of the same type of claims asserted by petitioner 
in his habeas corpus petition. See, In Re Hall, 637 P.2d 690 
(Cal. 1981) (petitioner was denied adequate representation of 
counsel by his attorney's failure to adequately investigate the 
case and to challenge identification procedures utilized by 
police); People v. Ledesma, 729 P.2d 839 (Cal. 1987) (writ of 
habeas corpus granted when defendant was denied effective 
assistance of counsel for failing to undertake adequate factual 
investigation and legal research and for failing to move to 
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suppress improperly admitted evidence); U.S. v. Baynes, 687 F.2d 
659 (2d Cir. 1982) (counsel was ineffective in failing to 
introduce evidence challenging identity of defendant in tape 
recording); Vella v. Estelle, 708 F.2d 954 (5th Cir. 1983) 
(counsel was ineffective when he allowed prejudicial evidence as 
to the murder victim's good character to be introduced at trial); 
Voyles v. Watkins, 489 F.Supp. 901 (D. Miss. 1980) (counsel was 
ineffective in failing to obtain witnesses as to the credibility 
of the chief prosecution witness, and in failing to request 
instructions warning of the danger of accomplice testimony); 
McQueen v. Swensen, 560 F.2d 959 (3rd Cir. 1977) (counsel 
ineffective when he failed to conduct investigation and failed to 
call critical witness requested by petitioner); Code v. 
Montgomery, 725 F.2d 1316 (11th Cir. 1984) (petitioner entitled 
to evidentiary hearing to develop facts relevant to claim that his 
attorney failed to investigate and present at trial his alibi 
defense). 
Moreover, the evidentiary hearings in both Cordianna and 
Bundy also addressed the issues of failure to investigate 
defense, failure to make objections and to properly instruct, and 
failure to present requested evidence. 
The other claims asserted by Petitioner concerning 
prosecutorial misconduct and lower court error can also be grounds 
for habeas corpus relief assuming that waiver on direct appeal did 
not occur and assuming that such errors were prejudicial. (See, 
Appellant's opening Brief pages 14-20). Again, the validity of 
these claims require an opportunity for Petitioner to present the 
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facts and circumstances to the lower court either by way of 
affidavit, memorandum, or in-court testimony. He is entitled to 
have the file available to him so he can adequately prepare his 
claims. He was denied this request and therefore could not have 
been prepared for the January hearing in any event. 
In conclusion, while the State claims that "when closely 
examined, none of the claims raised by Petitioner rise to the 
constitutional level" such a statement is clearly incorrect since 
some of the claims if factually proven would give rise to habeas 
corpus relief. (Respondent's Brief, p. 7). Both the Attorney 
General and the lower court, therefore, have arbitrarily decided 
based upon mere allegations alone that Petitioner has no claim for 
relief even though the types of claims asserted by Petitioner can 
give rise to relief under proper circumstances. 
For these reasons, therefore, the lower court could not, as a 
matter of law, find under the existing record that Petitioner 
could not establish a claim of fundamental unfairness which under 
any set of circumstances would not justify relief under Rule 65B. 
CONCLUSION 
The procedure in habeas corpus proceedings must be carefully 
guarded by this Court since there is clearly a tendency of lower 
courts to speedily adjudicate them because of the large numbers 
filed each year. In the instant case Petitioner made a continued 
and strong effort to urge his court-appointed appellate counsel to 
raise numerous issues on direct appeal which were not raised in 
the appellantfs Brief. Petitioner in this case because of his 
fear of preclusion in a later proceeding even went so far as to 
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require his appellate attorney to sign an affidavit stating that 
the decision to raise only one issue on appeal was totally that of 
the court-appointed counsel. 
In the habeas corpus proceeding Petitioner was met with the 
very argument he feared during his direct appeal. The lower 
court, contrary to Rule 65B, entered no specific findings or 
conclusions concerning the waiver argument of the state but merely 
held that the petition "failed to state a claim." The record now 
before this Court, however, shows that the question of waiver 
should have been examined by the lower court and dealt with in an 
evidentiary hearing in which the extent of Petitioner's efforts to 
raise these issues could be examined. It was clearly error to 
base any denial of habeas corpus relief upon such waiver without a 
full inquiry having been made. 
Second, contrary to Rule 65B(8) the Court failed to enter 
specific findings of fact and conclusions of law even though the 
rule speaks in terms of "in each case." The lower court erred in 
concluding without any hearing or examination of the facts in this 
case that Petitioner's claims were insubstantial and did not 
result in a prejudicial denial of constitutional rights. Whether 
such claims will withstand a full factual inquiry is not the issue 
in this case. The issue is simply whether a petitioner who 
alleges a legally sufficient claim is entitled to present his 
factual evidence before a lower court with adequate documentation 
provided by the Court, with the assistance of counsel, and with 
adequate time before the petition is denied on the basis that the 
claims cannot be substantiated. This is not a case in which 
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Petitioner brought claims which, under no circumstances, could 
ever result in violation of constitutional rights. 
For these reasons, therefore, this Court should remand this 
matter to the lower court for an evidentiary hearing. 
Respectfully submitted this 28th day of November, 1988. 
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APPENDIX 
AFFIDAVIT 
AFFIDAVIT AS TO CORRECTNESS 
OF SUPREME COURT APPEAL. 
Xiaz, the Attormey in the above Affidavit state: 
Tha^ g^ T realize that my Client may not use the remedy of a Habeas 
Corpus as a substitute for a Direct Appeal. That a petitioner 
cannot raise issues in a Habeas proceeding that could or should 
have been raised on Direct Appeal. 
My Client has had the desire to raise other issues like, 
Ineffectiveness of Counsel, T.TI ^^1 r>opnfii +H nr* t improper Off ear of 
Bviderice, Prooccutor!o Failure lo Dincloo^ 5v4rde**»e- Favorable to my 
Giient, and ByoWitness-Fragility Inatuuilicin, but I have discouraged-
him from going in that direction because I feel it would bo a wnste n 
of-t-jgie-and they, are very weak-podbn^e fur thia Direct Appeal remedy* '*^^v 
They do not fit the rules for Direct Appeal points. Au/Ji^y in tkx. r-*<«*J 
My Client under my direction had left the-^ e pointy out * S/^y^'i 
because I have advised him to. If at a later date there arises a^^j^J^ 
controversy from another court, I take full responsibility for my/*\ UAZL 
Clients1 failure to bring up h±s- cliier point/* *A-.~/ c^w 
\K\ ' / ' l < J ,, 
I~-s±gnr-i±t^ ^ ^ ^ . 
Sessional .ethics -and Jaiowledge^of^the Direct Appeal- process-and Jj -
p^eeedures. i&Ri will be available at any time to answer any quest- "^  "' 
ions as to my judgements in Richard L. Jensens1 Supreme Court Appeal 
or any other remedy. 
EARL XIAZAttb^ne^/ At Law 
WITNESS: To Signing 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
RESIDING AT: 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES 
YENGICK RICH, XAIZ & METOS 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
72 E. 4 0 0 SO.. SUITE 3 5 5 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 841 11 
T E L E P H O N E (801) 355-0320 
*ONALD J . YENGICH 
&RADLEY P. R ICH 
IARL XAIZ 
5. FRED METOS 
A p r i l 1 7 , 1986 
Richard Jensen 
P.O. Box 250-17541 
Draperr Utah 84020 
Attorney/Client Correspondence 
Re: Supreme Court Appeal 
Dear Richard, 
Word has reached me through messages from you and your 
sister that there is a problem with the brief I have left with 
you. Please keep in mind the fact that the brief is due on May 
3rd, 1986. I need at least one week prior to that date in order 
to have the brief proof-read and printed. Please let me know 
what's up as soon as possible. 
Very truly yours , 
EX/hab 
EARL XAIZ 
YENGICH. RICH, XAIZ & METOS 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
7 2 E. 4 0 0 SO., SUITE 3 5 5 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 841 1 1 
T E L E P H O N E (801) 355-0320 
!ONALD J . YENGICH 
IRADLEY P. R ICH 
ARL XAIZ 
J. F R E D M E T O S 
August 18, 1986 
Richard Lawrence Jensen 
c/o Utah State Prison 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84020 
Attorney/Client correspondence 
Dear Richard: 
I am in agreement with you on your assessment of the 
Attorney General's brief. It is as weak a response as I have 
seen. 
With regard to a reply brief, it is my policy not to reply 
unless the Attorney General raises an issue or argument that 
we failed to, or did not, raise in our brief. However, I realize 
that your approach to this appeal is somewhat different than 
mine. Therefore, I suggest that you write something up as 
quickly as possible and get it to me. I will then read it and 
get back to you so that we can file within the 30 days that we 
have. 
Finally, although I believe that our communication channels 
have improved over the last few months, it appears that you are 
still somewhat apprehensive concerning my feelings towards you. 
Nevertheless, I will continue, as I have all along, to do the 
best I can to represent your interests. 






Richard L. Jensen 
P.O. Box 250 
Jraper, Utah 84020 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 







L. JENSEN : 
Defendant, : 
MOTION FOR ORDER TO PRODUCE 
DOCUMENTS TO PERFECT APDENDEM 
TO SUPREME COURT APPEAL. 
CRIMINAL CASE NO. CR85-348. 
JUDGE: Judith Billings 
COMES NOW, RICHARD L. JENSEN, the Defendant in the above 
cs.ptioned case, and states he is unlearned in the law, acting Pro Se 
for himself. He asks the Court to take this fact into consideration, 
and accordingly apply the "less stringent standards," set dovm in Haines 
v. Ko.-iraer, 404 US 519 925. CT 594, 30 LED, 2d 252 (1972). 
RICHARD L. JENSEN, hereby MOVES this Court for an Order 








Copy of the Minute Entries of Instant Case and complete file. 
Copy of Orginal Handwritten Police Reports of the Instant Case, 
Transcript: of Sentencing Hearing held on Oct. 21, 1985. 
Transcript of Closing Arguments of Instant Case. 
Copy of Receipt for Property taken from the Defendant amd use as 
Evidence in the trial# Note; U.C.A. 77-24-5• 
Copy of the Pre-Sentence Report. 
7) Copy of Notice from Prosecution concerning the use of the Defendants1 
Alibi Witness Terri Harris as States1 witness also. According to 
U.C.A. 77-14-2 (2),(3). 
The Defendant has requested for these documents from past 
counsel and present counsel, hut has been selectively ignored by both. 
JJee: Rules of Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar, DR 2-110 a). 
RICHARD L. JENSEN, PRAYS, this Court will ORDER these docu-
ments be produced. That the Court will secure his rights under the Con-
stitution of the State of Utah and the United States. 
If this matter cannot be resolved by Order from the Court, 
then the Defendant requests a hearing, to discuss why the Court would 
refused him to investigate his own case in order to defend himself for 
the reason of adding an Addendem to his Supreme Court Appeal. DATED 
AND SIGNED, this g, Day of ggpfrn-bre 1986. 
RICHARD L. JENSEN Pro Se 
:hard 1. Jensen 
C. Box 250 
iper, Utah 8402G 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
El AND poR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH 
.?£ UF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
BX<D L. JENSEN 
Defendant• 
Criminal Case No. CR85-348. 
MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA 
PAUPERIS with included APPIDAVIT 
OP IMPECUNIOSITY. 
JUDGE: Judith Billings 
COlCiCD NOW, RICHARD L. JENSEN, and being duly sworn, deposes 
3h.ys: 1) lhat he is the Defendant in the above entitled case and 
t; 2) He is impecunious and without funds, securities or credit with 
ch to prepay the costs of filing and maintaining this action to con-
sic •n. 
THEREFORE, Petitioner-Affiant, RICHARD L. JENSEN, hereby 
E3 this Court bo allow him to proceed in Porma Pauperis. 
SWORN TO, DATED AND SIGNED this 
£ Day of eep^. , 1986. 
RICHARD L. JENSEN Pro Se 
Petitioner 
N O T A R I Z A T I O N 
"SUBSCRIBE! AND SWORN TO before me t h i s . j Day of J/jf. 1986. 
RESIDING AT: 
T 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: 
M A I L I N G C E R T I F I C A l ' I O N 
"I hereby certify that I caused true and exact copies of the accompanying 
MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS with included AFFIDAVIT OF IMPECUN-
IOUS ITY: and the MOTION FOR ORDER TO PRODUCE DOCUMENTS TO PERFECT ADDEN-
DEM TO SUPREME COURT APPEAL; to be mailed U.S. postage prepaid, to each 
of the following; 1) H. Dixon Hindley, Clerk, The Third District Court 
for Salt lake County, 240 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84110; 
2) Juage Judith Billings, Third District Court for Salt Lake County, 
240 East 400 South, Salt Lake City Utah 84110, on this A Day of 
if/../ , 1986. 
UTOHARDL! \ JENSENP 
'G"^J 
